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MISSISSIPPI V. TENNESSEE:
RESOLVING AN INTERSTATE
GROUNDWATER DISPUTE
PETER G. BERRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the immortal line “Call me Ishmael,” Herman
Melville’s Moby Dick proceeds with a reflection on the attraction of
water.1 According to Melville, humans are drawn to water because “we
ourselves see in all rivers and oceans. It is the image of the ungraspable
phantom of life; and this is the key of it all.”2 Should there be any doubt
about the accuracy of Melville’s assessment, the news is filled with
events that are reminders of the continuing centrality of water to
modern civilization. For example, contaminated drinking water in Flint,
Michigan led to a political controversy that spilled into the presidential
primary.3 California’s multi-year lack of water occupied numerous
newspaper headlines.4 In Toledo, Ohio, a summer algae bloom on Lake
Erie briefly made the city’s water undrinkable and damaged public
perception of the city.5
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1. See HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 3–5 (1851) (ruminating about why humans are
drawn to bodies of water).
2. Id. at 5.
3. See Amy Chozick & Patrick Healy, In Democratic Debate, Bernie Sanders Pushes
Hillary Clinton on Trade and Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (March 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com
/2016/03/07/us/politics/democratic-debate.html (discussing agreement between Democratic
presidential hopefuls Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton over the Flint water crisis during a
Democratic debate).
4. See, e.g., Matt Stevens, Reservoirs are getting a big boost from ‘Miracle March’ — but the
drought isn’t over yet, L.A. TIMES (March 18, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local /california/lame-california-drought-20160318-story.html (evaluating the state of the California drought in light
of El Niño weather conditions).
5. See Tom Henry, Toxic algae struggles leave Toledo’s reputation hanging in the balance,
THE BLADE (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2015/08/02/Toxic-algaestrugglesleave-city-s-reputationhanging-in-the-balance.html (summarizing the ramifications of
the Lake Erie algae bloom for the city of Toledo).
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Water is also at the heart of Mississippi v. Tennessee,6 an original
jurisdiction case before the United States Supreme Court that involves
a dispute over aquifer groundwater.7 The Court has addressed water
disputes between states in the past, but never in the context of aquifers.8
Mississippi v. Tennessee provides an opportunity for the Court to do so.
It could confirm the arguments of Mississippi, which defines the
groundwater in the aquifer as an intrastate resource subject to its
sovereign ownership.9 Alternatively, the Court could side with the
defendants and label the aquifer as an interstate water resource subject
to the equitable apportionment doctrine.10 Considering the prevalence
of aquifers throughout the United States11 and their importance for
drinking water and agriculture,12 the Court’s decision may dramatically
shape the distribution of access to water.
This commentary begins with a summary of the factual and
procedural history of Mississippi v. Tennessee. It then offers a review of
the relevant legal doctrine underpinning the case. Next, the
commentary provides a synopsis of the parties’ legal arguments before
concluding with an assessment of how the Court may analyze them.
This commentary argues that the Court should side with the defendants
in treating the aquifer as an interstate resource, and apply equitable
apportionment.

6. 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015).
7. See Brief of the City of Memphis, Tennessee, and Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division
in Opposition to the State of Mississippi’s Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint in Original
Action at 1, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015) (No. 220143, Original) [hereinafter
Brief of the City of Memphis in Opposition] (characterizing the nature of the dispute with regard
to the Sparta Aquifer).
8. See Michael D. Tauer, Evolution of the Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment—
Mississippi v. Memphis, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 897, 901 (2011) [hereinafter Tauer] (“While this
doctrine has historically attended legal disputes over interstate waters, invocation of equitable
apportionment in the context of exclusively subterranean water . . . represents an expansion of
the doctrine beyond its historic contours.”).
9. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi on its Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint
in Original Action at 12–13, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015) (No. 220143, Original)
[hereinafter Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi].
10. Brief of the City of Memphis in Opposition, supra note 7, at 11–12 (describing the aquifer
as an interstate resource to which equitable apportionment applies).
11. United States Geological Survey, Principal Aquifers, USGS.GOV (April 14, 2015),
http://water.usgs.gov/ogw/aquiferbasics/alphabetical.html (listing principal aquifers by name).
12. See, e.g., United States Geological Survey, Regional Assessment of Groundwater Quality
in the Basin and Range, Rio Grande, Coastal Basins, and Central Valley Aquifer Systems of the
Southwestern United States, USGS.GOV (March 4, 2014), http://water.usgs.gov/nawqa/
studies/praq/swpa/ (“Basin-fill aquifers are an important source of groundwater for many cities
and agricultural communities in the arid and semiarid southwestern United States.”).
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FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, the State of Mississippi, brought this action against the
City of Memphis, Tennessee; the Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division
(MLGW); and the State of Tennessee (collectively the defendants)
over their use of water from the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer13 (the
Aquifer).14
The Aquifer is “an expansive, water-bearing sand formation” that
“extends beneath a surface area of approximately 70,000 square
miles.”15 It lies beneath portions of eight states, including Mississippi
and Tennessee.16 The Aquifer is comprised of “unconsolidated sand,
inter-stratified with silt and clay.”17 Water enters the Aquifer through
outcroppings at its boundary, which “provide hydraulic connection
between the aquifer and surface-water sources such as rivers, lakes, and
percolation of rainfall.”18 There is some natural flow in the Aquifer,
where “[u]nder natural conditions, the water . . . moves from east to
west at a rate of approximately one inch per day, or 30.4 feet per year.”19
Memphis began using groundwater from the Aquifer in 1886.20
Today, with a population of approximately 650,000, Memphis is the
largest city in the Mississippi embayment,21 and it is “the largest city in
the world that relies solely on ground water for its water supply.”22
Memphis uses 175 municipal wells “spread across 10 well fields” to

13. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct.
2916 (2015) (No. 220143, Original) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
14. The Aquifer is identified by an assortment of names in the litigation. See e.g., id. at 3
(“[T]he Aquifer consists of Sparta Sand and the equivalent Memphis Sand . . . .”). However, some
of these titles, such as Sparta Sand and Memphis Sand, are “local names for what is essentially
one sand layer that forms part of the middle Claiborne aquifer . . . [and that] the USGS
considers . . . to be one hydrologic unit.” Id. Other articles have used titles such as “Memphis
Sands Aquifer” as the descriptor. Tauer, supra note 8, at 899. Since these different terms are
aliases for the same hydrologic unit, for clarity this commentary will refer to the aquifer at issue
as “the Aquifer.”
15. Brief for the United States, supra note 13, at 2.
16. The Aquifer also “extends beneath” portions of Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas,
Missouri, Kentucky, and Illinois. Brief for the United States, supra note 13, at 2.
17. Paul W. McKee & Phillip D. Hays, The Sparta Aquifer: A Sustainable Water Resource,
USGS.GOV (February 18, 2014), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-111-02/ [hereinafter The Sparta
Aquifer].
18. Id.
19. Tauer, supra note 8, at 899.
20. BRIAN R. CLARK ET AL., GROUNDWATER AVAILABILITY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
EMBAYMENT 17 (2011).
21. Id.
22. Tauer, supra note 8, at 899 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 6, Hood ex rel. Mississippi v.
City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-60152)).
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obtain the water.23 In 2005, the wells “churned out the [A]quifer’s water
at a daily rate of more than 187 million gallons.”24 As a result of
MLGW’s pumping, Mississippi claims that there is a “cone of
depression extending into Mississippi.”25 In confined aquifers, such as
the portion of the Aquifer in question,26 “pumping causes a decrease in
. . . water pressure in the aquifer within the cone of depression. This
decrease in water pressure allows the water to expand slightly and
causes a slight compression of the solid skeleton of earth material in
the aquifer.”27 These cones of depression can “alter the direction of
ground-water flow,”28 and Mississippi asserts that these changes have
caused “water that had been located within the geographical
boundaries of Mississippi [to be] drawn into the wells supplying
Memphis.”29
On June 6, 2014, Mississippi moved for Leave to File a Bill of
Complaint in an Original Action against the defendants, asserting that
the defendants’ pumping fields are “forcibly extract[ing] high quality
groundwater from Mississippi into Tennessee for sale by MLGW. . . .
Under natural conditions, [the groundwater] would not leave
Mississippi’s Groundwater Storage.”30 The defendants filed opposition
briefs on September 5, 2014.31 The Court invited the Solicitor General
of the United States to write an amicus brief, which was filed on May
22, 2015.32 The Court granted leave for Mississippi to file a bill of
complaint on June 29, 2015.33 The case was assigned to the Honorable
Eugene E. Siler, Jr. as Special Master.34
Mississippi seeks declarations that it has exclusive ownership and
dominion “over groundwater located naturally in the [Aquifer]
23. See Boyce Upholt, An Interstate Battle for Groundwater, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/mississippi-memphis-tennesee-groundwateraquifer/418809/.
24. Id.
25. The State of Mississippi’s Motion For Leave to File Bill of Complaint in Original Action,
Complaint, and Brief in Support of Motion at 11, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015)
(No. 220143, Original) [hereinafter The State of Mississippi’s Motion].
26. See The Sparta Aquifer, supra note 17 (referring to the Aquifer as “confined as it dips
toward the axis of the embayment . . . generally corresponding with the Mississippi River”).
27. W.M. ALLEY ET AL., SUSTAINABILITY OF GROUND-WATER RESOURCES 14 (1999).
28. See McKee & Hays, supra note 26, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-111-02/.
29. Tauer, supra note 8, at 900.
30. The State of Mississippi’s Motion, supra note 25, at 5.
31. Supreme Court of the United States, NO. 220143 ORG, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, (April 8,
2016), http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/22o143.htm.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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underlying the sovereign borders of Mississippi,” and that the
defendants are responsible for “actionable trespass upon, and
conversion, taking, and misappropriation of, property belonging to
Mississippi and its people.”35 It prays for damages equal to the value of
the “groundwater taken wrongfully by Defendants” since 1985,
estimated at $615 million, or an accounting and payment of the “profits,
proceeds, consequential gains, saved expenditures, and other benefits .
. . plus prejudgment interest” retained by the defendants.36 Finally,
Mississippi seeks injunctive relief in the form of a requirement that
“Defendants . . . prospectively take all actions necessary to eliminate
the subject cone of depression” under Mississippi.37
This is not the first time that Mississippi has turned to the courts to
resolve disputes over water from the Aquifer.38 In 2005, Mississippi
sued Memphis and MLGW in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi, accusing them of “divert[ing] and
unlawfully [taking] over 363 billion gallons of ground water owned by
Mississippi” in violation of several tort and property theories.39 The
district court held that Tennessee was a necessary party to the case
because it “involved ‘a proprietary or ownership interest in subsurface
water,’” which required the Court to determine which portion of the
water belonged to each state.40 The district court “dismissed
Mississippi’s lawsuit without prejudice” because joining Tennessee as a
party triggers the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.41
Mississippi appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.42 There, Mississippi claimed that “contrary to the District
Court’s opinion, its complaint did not constitute an action ‘between two
states’ because it sought no relief from Tennessee and because it
exclusively owned the water in the Aquifer within its territorial
boundaries.”43 The Court of Appeals disagreed with Mississippi and
affirmed the district court, noting that “[t]he Aquifer is an interstate
35. The State of Mississippi’s Motion, supra note 25, at 23.
36. Id. at 22, 23.
37. Id. at 23.
38. See Brief of the City of Memphis in Opposition, supra note 7, at 1–2 (offering a history
of Mississippi’s attempts to resolve this issue in court).
39. These theories included nuisance, unjust enrichment, and trespass. Tauer, supra note 8,
at 897–898.
40. Id. at 919.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 920 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 16–17, Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of
Memphis, 570 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-60152)).
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water source, and the amount of water to which each state is entitled
from a disputed interstate water source must be allocated before one
state may sue an entity for invading its share.”44 Mississippi filed a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, and a Motion for Leave to File Bill of
Complaint in Original Action, both of which the Court denied.45 In
denying the latter, the Court cited Virginia v. Maryland,46 a case
upholding the applicability of equitable apportionment to interstate
water disputes.47
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Common Law Approach: Equitable
Apportionment
Interstate disputes over natural resources can be settled by
congressionally approved compacts or by the Supreme Court.48 When
the Court is asked to resolve such disputes, it applies equitable
apportionment,49 a doctrine grounded in the “equality of right” of the
states involved.50 When “the action of one state reaches, through the
agency of natural laws, into the territory of another state,” equitable
apportionment is applied “to settle that dispute in such a way as will
recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice
between them.”51
Equitable apportionment is a flexible doctrine influenced by a
range of factors.52 It is not grounded in “precise legal entitlements,” but
rather “broad and flexible equitable concerns.”53 As such, state borders
are not dispositive in resolving competing claims under equitable
apportionment.54

44. Hood, 570 F.3d at 630.
45. Tauer, supra note 8, at 922.
46. 540 U.S. 56 (2003).
47. Tauer, supra note 8, at 922–23.
48. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938)
(“Whether the apportionment of the water of an interstate stream be made by compact between
the upper and lower States with the consent of Congress or by a decree of this Court, the
apportionment is binding upon the citizens of each State and all water claimants.”).
49. Id.
50. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97–98 (1907).
51. Id.
52. See Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1027 (1983) (“Flexibility is the linchpin
in equitable apportionment cases, and, in our prior decisions, we have based apportionment on
the consideration of many factors to ensure a fair and equitable allocation.”).
53. Id. at 1025.
54. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323 (1984) (concluding that even though
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For interstate water disputes where there is no compact,55 “[f]ederal
common law governs . . . ensuring that the water is equitably
apportioned between the States and that neither State harms the
other’s interest . . . .”56 As a result, equitable apportionment is applied.57
The Court has employed the doctrine to water disputes in the context
of rivers58 and lakes.59
Equitable apportionment has not been applied to groundwater or
aquifers, however. Although the Court has used broad language that
subjects “disputes over the allocation of water” to equitable
apportionment, it was in the context of a water dispute involving the
Red River.60 Perhaps the closest that the Court has come was in Kansas
v. Colorado,61 where the Court chose not to distinguish between a river
and “an alleged underflow of the river . . . with the same course as that
on the surface, but with a distinct and continuous flow as of a separate
stream.”62 However, the Court’s refusal to differentiate was not based
on the relative characteristics of groundwater and those of a river, but
rather on “the testimony [which did] not warrant the finding of such
second and subterranean stream.”63 In other words, to the extent that
there was groundwater involved in the case, the Court considered it a
part of the river in question—an unlikely conclusion for the 70,000
square mile Aquifer at issue in Mississippi v. Tennessee.

“three-fourths of the water in the Vermejo River system is produced in Colorado,” the “source
of the Vermejo River’s waters should be essentially irrelevant to the adjudication of these
sovereigns’ competing claims”).
55. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 (2013) (“Absent an
agreement among the States, disputes over the allocation of water are subject to equitable
apportionment by the courts . . . .”).
56. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 74 n.9 (2003).
57. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (“Equitable apportionment
is the doctrine of federal common law that governs the disputes between States concerning their
rights to use the water of an interstate stream.”).
58. See, e.g., State of Connecticut v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670–71
(1931) (quoting Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465, 470 (1922)) (noting that in the context
of an interstate stream “the principles of right and equity shall be applied having regard to the
‘equal level or plane on which all the States stand, in point of power and right, under our
constitutional system’ and that, upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending
States and all other relevant facts, this Court will determine what is an equitable apportionment
of the use of such waters.”).
59. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48, 48 (1980) (applying equitable apportionment to “water
diverted from Lake Michigan”).
60. See Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. at 2125 (providing background on the Red River as context for
the case).
61. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
62. Id. at 114–15.
63. Id.
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B. Sovereign Rights and Water Ownership
Article Four, Section Three of the United States Constitution
directs that:
New states may be admitted by the Congress into this union; but no
new states shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any
other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more
states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of
the states concerned as well as of the Congress.64

When states enter the union in accordance with the article, they
“acquire[] equivalent rights [to existing states] under the equal-footing
doctrine.”65 Under the equal footing doctrine, because the “shores of
navigable waters, and the soils under them . . . were reserved to the
states respectively,” the “new states have the same rights, sovereignty,
and jurisdiction over this subject as the original states.”66 According to
the Supreme Court, a state has “full jurisdiction over the lands within
its borders, including the beds of streams and other waters.”67
State law also illustrates sovereign ownership of water. The 1985
Mississippi Omnibus Water Rights Act68 states that:
All water, whether occurring on the surface of the ground or
underneath the surface of the ground, is hereby declared to be
among the basic resources of this state and therefore belong to the
people of this state, and is subject to regulation in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter.

Tennessee has a similar law, which announces that “waters of the
state are the property of the state and are held in public trust for the
benefit of its citizens.”69 It defines groundwater as “water beneath the
surface of the ground, whether or not flowing through known or
definite channels.”70 These laws align with precedent, such as Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co.,71 which declares “in its capacity of quasisovereign . . . the state has an interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”72

64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
65. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 486 (1988) (O’Connor J., dissenting).
66. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 373 (1977)
(quoting Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845)).
67. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89–93 (1907).
68. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-1 (2003).
69. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-221-702 (2013).
70. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-221-703 (2013).
71. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
72. Id. at 237.
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Similarly, the Court has declared that “States possess an ‘absolute right
to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own
common use,’”73 and that “ownership of submerged lands, and the
accompanying power to control . . . other public uses of water, ‘is an
essential attribute of sovereignty.’”74
IV. ARGUMENTS
Mississippi has two primary legal arguments. First, Mississippi
asserts sovereign ownership and control over the groundwater within
its borders, including that contained in the portion of the Aquifer
underneath the state.75 Second, according to Mississippi, the Aquifer is
not subject to equitable apportionment.76 Both of Mississippi’s
arguments are dependent on its portrayal of the Aquifer as an
intrastate water resource.
According to Mississippi, the “groundwater at issue was naturally
collected and stored in a distinct deep sandstone geological formation
known as the ‘Sparta Sand.’”77 For Mississippi, the water did not just
land within its borders, but, crucially, it was trapped there.78 The state
notes that “[u]nder natural conditions, this groundwater volume and
pressure would have remained within Mississippi.”79 The groundwater
entered Tennessee only as a result of the unnatural conditions created
by MLGW’s pumping.80 Mississippi asserts that “Defendants’
mechanical pumping is intended to and does pull Mississippi’s
groundwater out of natural storage in a northward direction, altering
the water’s natural east-to-west path.”81 For evidence, Mississippi
points to a “hydrologic feature called a ‘cone of depression’” under the
state, which is caused by “a substantial drop in pressure and
corresponding drawdown of stored groundwater in the Sparta Sand.”82
Mississippi estimates that the defendants pump between 20 and 27
73. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. V. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2132 (2013) (quoting Martin v.
Lessee of Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842)).
74. Id. (quoting United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)).
75. See The State of Mississippi’s Motion, supra note 25, at 3, 5 (describing Mississippi’s
ownership of the water under the equal footing doctrine then later referring to the water at issue
as “Mississippi’s groundwater”).
76. Id. at 17–19.
77. Id. at 5.
78. See id. at 6 (“This high quality groundwater stored in Mississippi would never be
available within Tennessee’s territorial borders . . . .”).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 7–8 (outlining the effects of MLGW’s pumping efforts over time).
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id.
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million gallons per day of “Mississippi’s natural groundwater storage”
from the Sparta Sand.83
Based on this understanding of the Aquifer, Mississippi’s first main
legal argument is premised on the equal footing doctrine under Article
Four, Section Three of the United States Constitution.84 The state
argues that “Mississippi was admitted . . . to the Union on an equal
footing with the original thirteen colonies and, thereupon, became
vested with ownership, control[,] and dominion over the land and
waters within its territorial boundaries.”85 Mississippi relies on cases
such as Kansas v. Colorado,86 where the Court held that a state has “full
jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, including the beds of
streams and other waters.”87 Since that point, Mississippi has claimed
ownership of the water within its borders through legislation such as
the Omnibus Water Rights Act.88 Mississippi emphasizes that the
groundwater was trapped within its borders and is therefore its
property.
Mississippi also refutes Tennessee’s argument that equitable
apportionment should apply.89 Specifically, Mississippi distinguishes
the Aquifer from other bodies of water that are subject to equitable
apportionment by pointing out that unlike those resources, “[t]he
groundwater at issue here is . . . trapped within Mississippi in a deep
confined sandstone formation under natural conditions.”90 Mississippi
contends that “none of the cases cited by [the defendants] provide
authority for applying the doctrine of equitable apportionment to
intrastate groundwater which is not hydrologically connected to
interstate surface water already apportioned by the Court or an
interstate compact.”91 In particular, Mississippi questions the
applicability of Kansas v. Colorado. Mississippi construes the issue in
that case as limited to the “Court’s authority to resolve a conflict
between two states over the water in a river which naturally ran
between and among several states, but was not navigable.”92

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 8.
See id. at 3 (stating Mississippi’s theory with regard to the equal footing doctrine).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89–93 (1907).
The State of Mississippi’s Motion, supra note 25, at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 9, at 5.
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The defendants, meanwhile, treat the Aquifer as an interstate water
resource.93 Based on that understanding, they argue that equitable
apportionment is dispositive for the groundwater in question and
dispute Mississippi’s claim of sovereign ownership of the
groundwater.94 They also assert that Mississippi’s claims are barred by
issue preclusion as a result of the state’s unsuccessful 2005 litigation
over the Aquifer.95
The defendants argue that “[t]he fact that Mississippi and
Tennessee citizens in their respective states withdraw water from the
same Aquifer confirms it is ‘an interstate natural resource shared by
the competing states under the conditions put into place by nature.’”96
Tennessee compares the Aquifer to the Arkansas River, relying on the
Court’s statement in Kansas v. Colorado that “[b]efore either Kansas
or Colorado was settled the Arkansas River was a stream running
through the territory which now composes these two states.”97 The
defendants note, “In the same way, before either Tennessee or
Mississippi was settled, the Aquifer was a natural water resource
underlying the territory that now composes those two states.”98 For the
defendants, the Aquifer is no different than the water resources
addressed in other equitable apportionment cases, including lake water
in Wisconsin v. Illinois, and subsurface water connected to a river in
Kansas v. Colorado.99
Since they view the Aquifer as an interstate water resource, the
defendants consider equitable apportionment as the necessary tool to
resolve the parties’ conflicting interests.100 Inherently, this means that
the defendants reject Mississippi’s sovereignty arguments, which they
dismiss as “contrary to [the] Court’s long-standing equitable

93. See Brief of Defendant State of Tennessee in Opposition to State of Mississippi’s Motion
for Leave to File Bill of Complaint in Original Action, at 18, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct.
2916 (2015) (No. 220143, Original) [hereinafter Brief of Defendant State of Tennessee in
Opposition] (“Because the Aquifer is a shared interstate water resource . . . .”).
94. Id. at 14, 17–18 (outlining an argument in support of the applicability of equitable
apportionment, and noting that “a State has no inherent right to the portion of an interstate water
resource that happens to reside within its territorial boundaries”).
95. Id. at 22.
96. Brief of the City of Memphis in Opposition, supra note 7, at 12 (quoting The State of
Mississippi’s Motion, supra note 25, at 15).
97. Id. at 12 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 13.
100. See id. at 12–13 (accusing Mississippi of violating Tennessee’s sovereignty because
“Mississippi wrongly presumes its rights to the unapportioned water in the Aquifer are superior
to Tennessee’s rights to the same interstate resource”).
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apportionment precedents.”101 The defendants rely on Colorado v. New
Mexico and similar cases to support the assertion that “in the context
of interstate water disputes, a state’s border is ‘essentially
irrelevant.’”102 They argue that Mississippi’s territory-based argument
conflicts with the multi-faceted considerations of equitable
apportionment.103 “Mississippi’s legal position is without merit,”
according to the defendants, “because if a state’s boundary line alone
determined that state’s allocation of an interstate resource,” then
equitable apportionment by the Court would be “unnecessary.”104
Furthermore, the defendants contend that Mississippi cannot own
the groundwater at issue because the Court “[e]xplained groundwater
is not subject to state ‘ownership’ in the proprietary or possessory
sense.”105 Although Mississippi cites Kansas v. Colorado for the
proposition that a state has “full jurisdiction over the lands within its
borders, including the beds of streams and other waters,”106 the
defendants dismiss sovereign ownership as a “legal fiction.”107
Finally, the defendants contend that “[b]ecause Mississippi’s claims
depend on the very same territorial property rights theory that it
advanced and lost in [the 2005 litigation], issue preclusion bars its
claims as a matter of law.”108 According to the defendants, the Fifth
Circuit already rejected and settled Mississippi’s arguments, including
that “it owns the portion of the [A]quifer located within its borders,”
that it has sovereign control of the water, and that the Aquifer is an
intrastate resource.109 As such, “Mississippi already had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate those issues,” and the Court declined to revisit
the Fifth Circuit’s holdings by denying Mississippi’s petition for
certiorari.110
In response, Mississippi argues that its claims are not barred by
issue preclusion.111 First, it asserts that both the district court and the

101. Id. at 16.
102. Id. (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323 (1984)).
103. Id. at 16.
104. Id. at 17.
105. Id. (quoting Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 949–51 (1982)).
106. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 9, at 5 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 89–93 (1907)).
107. Brief of the City of Memphis in Opposition, supra note 7, at 17.
108. Brief of Defendant State of Tennessee in Opposition, supra note 93, at 22.
109. Id. at 22–25 (identifying Mississippi’s arguments that the defendants believe are barred
by issue preclusion).
110. Id. at 26.
111. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 9, at 9.
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Fifth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to resolve the claim. To the extent that
the courts might have determined “the parameters of Mississippi’s
rights vis-à-vis Tennessee,” they were inherently in the domain of
“original and exclusive jurisdiction over controversies between the
states,” which belongs to the Supreme Court.112 Second, according to
Mississippi, even if the lower courts ruled on its claims, the claims were
not essential to the judgment because the only necessary issue “was
that Mississippi’s claims of groundwater ownership implicated
Tennessee’s sovereign interests.”113
IV. ANALYSIS
Mississippi v. Tennessee is the first Supreme Court case to address
the applicability of the equitable apportionment doctrine to aquifers.114
Thus, the case has the potential to be enormously influential. According
to the United States Geological Survey (“USGS”), there are over sixty
principal aquifers in the United States,115 many of which cross state
borders.116 Considering this, similar interstate disputes over water from
these aquifers are plausible, especially because some are under strain.117
The Court has the opportunity to reaffirm the application of
equitable apportionment, and hold that it is dispositive in the context
of groundwater. Alternatively, the Court could place aquifers in the
context of sovereign property ownership, much like land.
The path it selects depends upon which state’s interpretation of fact
the Court finds more compelling, because both parties’ legal arguments
are inherently linked to their respective portrayals of the Aquifer.
Mississippi will be victorious if the Court is persuaded by its depiction
of the Aquifer as an intrastate water resource. Conversely, if the Court
112. Id.
113. Id. at 11.
114. See Tauer, supra note 8, at 901.
115. See United States Geological Survey, Principal Aquifers, USGS.GOV (Tuesday, 14-Apr2015 14:01:19 EDT), http://water.usgs.gov/ogw/aquiferbasics/alphabetical.html [hereinafter
Principal Aquifers] (listing principal aquifers by name).
116. See United States Geological Survey, Aquifers: Map of the Principal Aquifers of the
United States, USGS.GOV (Friday, 27-Feb-2015 17:44:51 EST) http://water.usgs.gov /ogw/aquifer
/map.html (mapping U.S. aquifers, many of which cross state boundaries).
117. See United States Geological Survey, Regional Assessment of Groundwater Quality in
the Basin and Range, Rio Grande, Coastal Basins, and Central Valley Aquifer Systems of the
Southwestern United States, USGS.GOV, (Tuesday, 04-Mar-2014 14:45:25 EST) http://water.usgs.
gov/nawqa/studies/praq/swpa/ (“Basin-fill aquifers are an important source of groundwater for
many cities and agricultural communities in the arid and semiarid southwestern United States.
The quality of groundwater is of concern because of the general scarcity of renewable water
supplies in the region.”).
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analogizes the Aquifer to an interstate water resource, such as a river
or a lake, then the defendants will likely succeed unless the Court holds
that equitable apportionment doctrine is negated by their unnatural
pumping of water.
In determining whether the groundwater in this case is covered by
equitable apportionment or Mississippi’s sovereignty, there are two
main considerations. First, what is the aquifer—land or water? Second,
does it matter that the defendants’ actions have created unnatural
conditions? Before resolving either main issue, the Court will have to
resolve the threshold matter of whether Mississippi’s claims are barred
by issue preclusion.
A. Issue Preclusion
Most likely, the Court will side with Mississippi and hold that its
claims are not barred by issue preclusion. First, although cases of
original jurisdiction are different than cases in which the Court grants
certiorari, the Court is still not required to grant leave for motions to
file an original complaint.118 It decides which original jurisdiction cases
to hear on a “case-by-case” basis, based on “the practical necessity of
an original forum in [the] Court for particular disputes within [the
Court’s] constitutional original jurisdiction.”119 That the Court has
chosen to grant leave for Mississippi to file its complaint suggests that
the Court considers the claim worthy of its resources. Granting leave
for a claim, and then barring it based on issue preclusion, would seem
like an odd exercise for the high court.
Second, as Mississippi asserts, the Fifth Circuit premised its decision
on Tennessee being a necessary defendant to Mississippi’s claim.120 In
holding so, the court noted that the case was “squarely within the
original development and application of the equitable apportionment
doctrine.”121 Considering that equitable apportionment between states
is a tool for the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to
address specific remedies in the case. As a result, Mississippi’s claims
should not be barred by issue preclusion.
118. See Brief for the United States, supra note 13, at 1–2 (“The Court has determined that its
exercise of this exclusive jurisdiction is ‘obligatory only in appropriate cases.’”) (quoting
Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76 (1992)).
119. Id. at 12.
120. See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 570 F.3d 625, 631 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“Therefore, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Tennessee’s presence in the
lawsuit was necessary to accord complete relief to Mississippi and Memphis.”).
121. Id. at 630.
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B. Defining the Aquifer: Land or Water?
Mississippi’s arguments about sovereign ownership of groundwater
work best if the Aquifer is analogous to land. Although the equal
footing doctrine gives states sovereign ownership of the “shores of
navigable waters, and the soils under them,”122 it offers little guidance
about the water itself. In other words, although Mississippi may own
the land under many of its water resources, it may not have control of
the actual water.123 Although its own laws recognize the ownership of
water within its borders, these laws can have little influence over water
that flows between states;124 that is the traditional domain of equitable
apportionment.125 However, if the groundwater is indistinguishable
from the land itself, then the state sovereignty approach is more
convincing because the water would be a part of the land-based
resources the state controls.
Conversely, if the Aquifer is more like a subterranean lake or river,
where water flows between states, then equitable apportionment will
likely control. Not only would the water be beyond Mississippi’s
sovereignty, but it would also implicate the conflicting state interests
that equitable apportionment is meant to resolve.
The physical characteristics of the Aquifer suggest that it is more
closely analogous to a river than it is to land. Aquifers present an
intriguing problem, as they have characteristics of both land and
water.126 In the case of unconsolidated and semiconsolidated sand and
gravel aquifers like the Aquifer, water is interspersed with
“semiconsolidated sand interbedded with silt, clay, and minor
carbonate rocks.”127 Nevertheless, both rivers and aquifers are conduits
through which water moves. The main distinction is that rivers
122. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845).
123. See Brief for the United States, supra note 13, at 1–2 (claiming that states have
“ownership of the lands within their respective borders, not the waters themselves”).
124. Tauer, supra note 8, at 904 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907))
(although “each was able to choose the water use doctrine that would apply within its borders . . .
“[n]either state can legislate for, or impose its own policy upon the other”).
125. See Kansas, 206 U.S. at 97–98 (explaining that when “the action of one state reaches,
through the agency of natural laws, into the territory of another state” equitable apportionment
is applied “to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the
same time establish justice between them”).
126. See United States Geological Survey, Ground Water, USGS.GOV,
http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/gw/gw_a.html (“Ground water is stored in, and moves slowly through,
moderately to highly permeable rocks called aquifers.”).
127. See United States Geological Survey, Aquifer Basics: Unconsolidated and
Semiconsolidated Sand and Gravel Aquifers, USGS.GOV (Tuesday, 14-Apr-2015 13:39:55 EDT)
http://water.usgs.gov/ogw/aquiferbasics/uncon.html.
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represent the movement of water over land, while aquifers implicate
the movement of water through land.128 The groundwater implicated in
Mississippi v. Tennessee is not an exception. It is uncontested that there
is at least some flow of water in the Aquifer.129 Furthermore, the USGS
characterizes the Aquifer as an interconnected hydrologic unit.130
Additionally, the alleged damages indicate that Mississippi views
this dispute as one over water rather than land. Although Mississippi
does ask for a remedy for the conical depression under its territory
caused by the pumping, which is a potential injury to the land, the vast
majority of the damages sought by the state relate to the taking of the
water itself. Thus, the dispute is over the groundwater, not the ground.
Both the characteristics of the Aquifer and the nature of
Mississippi’s claims indicate that the Aquifer is more like water than
land. Therefore, equitable apportionment should apply unless the
doctrine is inapposite due to the unnatural conditions created by the
defendants.
C. Does Equitable Apportionment Apply Despite Unnatural
Conditions?
Although the Aquifer is more like an interstate water resource such
as a river than a sovereign resource like land, Mississippi might still be
victorious if the Court finds that the unnatural conditions involved here
bar the application of equitable apportionment. Mississippi asserts that
defendants’ pumping activities have changed both the direction and
flow of the water in the Aquifer.131
Nevertheless, unnatural conditions do not derail the application of
equitable apportionment. Although the changes to direction and flow
of water in Mississippi v. Tennessee might seem unique to aquifers, “it
is conceptually no different from a claim that an upstream State has
diverted river water that would naturally have flowed down-stream.”132

128. See Principal Aquifers, supra note 115 (“The word aquifer comes from the two Latin
words, aqua, or water, and ferre, to bear or carry. Aquifers literally carry water underground. An
aquifer may be a layer of gravel or sand, a layer of sandstone or cavernous limestone, a rubbly
top or base of lava flows, or even a large body of massive rock, such as fractured granite, that has
sizable openings.”).
129. See Brief of Defendant State of Tennessee in Opposition, supra note 93, at 18
(“[Mississippi] further admits that the Aquifer is an interconnected hydrological formation and
that, in its natural state, the water in the Aquifer flows, even if slowly, across state boundaries.”).
130. Brief for the United States, supra note 13, at 1–2.
131. Id.
132. Brief of Defendant State of Tennessee in Opposition, supra note 93, at 19.
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The Court applies equitable apportionment to traditional interstate
water resources even in the face of unnatural conditions. For example,
the Court applied equitable apportionment to a dispute over water
flow in State of Connecticut v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, where
“Connecticut filed an original suit seeking to enjoin Massachusetts
from diverting water from the Ware and Swift Rivers into the
Wachusett reservoir.”133 Although the unnatural conditions in
Mississippi v. Tennessee involve an increase in water flow rather than a
decrease, the same considerations of relative state interests clearly
apply. Similarly, the water diversion in State of Connecticut v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts did not involve just a change in water
flow, but also direction.134 Nevertheless, equitable apportionment still
applied,135 so neither of the unnatural conditions cited in Mississippi v.
Tennessee are relevant.
The Aquifer is most accurately described as an interstate water
resource, as evidenced by the characteristics of the Aquifer itself and
by the nature of the damage. As a result, it is irrelevant that the
defendants’ actions have altered the natural characteristics of the
resource. Such changes implicate exactly the kinds of conflicting state
interests that the Court is best able to resolve with equitable
apportionment.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should side with the defendants and hold that
the Aquifer is an interstate water resource and that equitable
apportionment applies. The Aquifer is most accurately characterized as
an interstate water resource based both on its attributes and the
damages that Mississippi alleges. Although the activities of the
defendants may have altered the characteristics of the Aquifer, these
changes involve the conflicting state interests which equitable
apportionment is best suited to balance.

133. See Tauer, supra note 8, at 909–10.
134. See 282 U.S. 660, 663 (1931) (“The proposed diversion will take water tributary to the
Connecticut [River] entirely out of its watershed.”).
135. Id. at 671.

